Random bits
28 September 2009Random bits
25 September 2009Galrahn making lots of sense on the UK nuclear deterrent
A Bell inequality has been violated in a system of Josephson phase qubits and the D-Wave crowd has implemented a “novel rf-SQUID flux qubit that is robust against fabrication variations in Josephson junction critical currents and device inductance” (just when it seemed like Dave Wineland’s group at NIST suddenly had a monopoly on experimental advances in quantum computing, superconducting qubits start getting entangled all over the place)
The Annals of Probability has a couple of memorial articles on Joe Doob (available on the arxiv here and here)
update:
“[Iran has] cheated three times,” one senior administration official with access to the intelligence said of the Iranians late on Thursday evening. “And they have now been caught three times.”
The official was referring to information unearthed by an Iranian dissident group that led to the discovery of the underground plant at Natanz in 2002, and evidence developed two years ago — after Iran’s computer networks were pierced by American intelligence agencies — that the country had secretly sought to design a nuclear warhead. American officials believe that effort was halted in late 2003.
Random bits
24 September 2009“A construction firm in Maine is suing a local bank after cyber thieves stole more than a half million dollars from the company in a sophisticated online bank heist” (as Bruce Schneier says, the “only way to mitigate this kind of [thing...is to] ensure that the person who has the ability to mitigate the risk is responsible for the risk”)
Another preprint from Wineland’s ion trap group demonstrates ion transport through Y-junctions of a surface-electrode trap. The work these folks have been putting out there in the last couple of months really looks exciting, and might signal a new phase in progress towards useful quantum computation.
Jaynes and the Gibbs paradox
21 September 2009Ed Jaynes (see also here) quoted Eugene Wigner as saying that “entropy is an anthropomorphic concept” and provided his own elaboration of this idea:
It is necessary to decide at the outset of a problem which macroscopic variable or degrees of freedom we shall measure and/or control; and within the context of the thermodynamic system this defined, entropy will be some function
of whatever variables we have chosen. We can expect this to obey the second law
only as long as all experimental manipulations are confined to that chosen set. If someone, unknown to us, were to vary a macrovariable
outside that set, he could produce what would appear to us as a violation of the second law, since our entropy function
might decrease spontaneously, while his
increases.
As part of Jaynes’ MAXENT program, he discoursed at some length on the Gibbs paradox. In one version of this, a box contains a monatomic ideal gas of atoms in equilibrium. Now divide the box in half by an impermeable membrane. A naïve computation of the entropy might suggest that
. The resolution of this is found in the recognition that introducing the membrane effectively distinguishes atoms on one side of the membrane from those on the other side. But the molecules in the undivided volume are indistinguishable, and if we divide the partition function by the right factorial, the paradox disappears.
Jaynes analyzed the Gibbs paradox in detail and concluded that
The rules of thermodynamics are valid and correctly describe the measurements that it is possible to make by manipulating the macrovariables within the set that we have chosen to use…The entropy of mixing does indeed represent human information; just the information needed to predict the work available from the mixing.
Lawrence Sklar cites an example of Gibbs’ paradox with hydrogen gas in singlet and triplet states that is attractive but that I think is misleading: molecular collisions in a gas will induce transitions in the spin states that would greatly complicate attempts to deal with entropies of mixing. However Sklar’s point that entropies depend on the level of physical description is correct, as an amended example with (e.g.) molecular enantiomers (i.e., chiral “mirror images”) quite clearly shows.
The dependence of entropies on levels of description is fully manifested in information theory, and it is important to keep issues like this in mind when using entropy methods for anomaly detection, or more generally techniques like some of ours, in which network traffic is mapped onto the model thermodynamic system of a (typically single-particle) Bose gas. The practical utility of this sort of technique was again anticipated by Jaynes:
A physical system always has more macroscopic degrees of freedom beyond what we control or observe, and by manipulating them a trickster can always make us see an apparent violation of the second law.
Therefore the correct statement of the second law is not that an entropy decrease is impossible in principle, or even improbable; rather that it cannot be achieved reproducibly by manipulating the macrovariables
that we have chosen to define our macrostate. Any attempt to write a stronger law than this will put one at the mercy of a trickster, who can produce a violation of it.
But recognizing this should increase rather than decrease our confidence in the future of the second law, because it means that if an experimenter ever sees an apparent violation, then instead of issuing a sensational announcement, it will be more prudent to search for that unobserved degree of freedom. That is, the connection of entropy with information works both ways; seeing an apparent decrease of entropy signifies ignorance of what were the relevant macrovariables.
One of the things that we’ve done is to demonstrate (look at the data from the paper “Effective temperature for finite systems” on our downloads page) that using a small set of source/destination attributes of packets to define macrovariables reflecting the bulk traffic characteristics and looking for “tricksters” can be done quite effectively using the mathematical apparatus of statistical physics.
I have mixed feelings about Jaynes’ legacy. The two things he is most known for are his advocacy of Bayesian inference (I personally feel like conditional probability is not a big deal and have never been able to understand why the choice of a justified prior is a big deal, but I have seen lots of smart people mess this sort of thing up) and maximum entropy (I think it’s usually a good approximation technique that has to be used with some care–sometimes more than its practitioners employ). But I’ve got to hand it to the man for his ability to flesh out hidden assumptions and to transform “obvious” facts into powerful tools. A referee said about his original maximum entropy work that
It has no apparent practical application whatsoever. The problem and the point of view are not familiar to physicists. As a physicist I would raise the question whether the point of view is entirely new, whether it has been discussed explicitly by Information Theory people, or whether it is implicit in the work of Information Theory experts. I would guess that it is at least implicit in their thinking.
Jaynes framed this review and hung it on his wall. I think it’s safe to say he got the last laugh there.
Graphene
17 September 2009Whenever I browse the cond-mat archive these days I’m constantly amazed at the number of papers dealing with graphene. And a lot of them look really interesting, for example this one from yesterday. There’s a lot of interest among theorists and experimentalists in graphene as an experimentally accessible substrate for two-dimensional quantum field theory, and there’s a lot of ways in which this material might be applied, especially in electronics.
A quick lookup shows the growth of papers in cond-mat with “graphene” in the title took over a year to take off since the first big paper dealing with it, but boy did it take off:

The number for 2009 is a projection that assumes a constant rate of papers per month in a given year (i.e., 458 papers so far should lead to about 643 for 2009).
The interesting thing to me about this graph is that it looks like a logistic. This is what you’d expect the dissemination of information to behave like, and my eighth-grade science project was on modeling the spread of rumors this way. On the other hand, the graph also looks like part of a Gaussian (though the eyeball fit doesn’t look as good, I won’t bother with numerics in either case since there’s not very good data), but graphene research is almost certainly not a flash in the pan–there are too many potential applications. But since the inflection point has been passed I think it may be time to consider graphene as a distinct discipline within condensed matter theory.
Random bits
14 September 2009Chinese researchers study where attacks on the Western US power grid would have the most impact
You never know when someone else might need an alibi
“There is exactly one way to make a system or network completely secure. Keep it turned off.”
Are impossibility proofs possible?
Quantum resolution to the arrow of time paradox?…Not so fast
One of Smale’s problems supposedly near solution
Posted by eqnets
Arquilla on the cyberoffensive
22 September 2009From a Wired blurb covering John Arquilla’s ideas about cyberdeterrence:
Over the past decade I have maintained the hope and at times even a tentative belief that cyberwar might be “kinder, gentler” war. I still hold that hope, but not the belief.
History and common sense have shown over time that militaries seek to make war more controllable for themselves and more chaotic for their opponents. But the nature of opponents has changed, and has typically broadened unless or until combatants are able or willing to sacrifice an advantage in raw killing power. The concept of total war has evolved with the Grande Armée, the March to the Sea, unrestricted submarine warfare in World War I, strategic bombing in World War II, and the nuclear hostage-taking of the Cold War. I suspect that the next total war will be organized around cyber. And make no mistake, the cyberwar will be unpleasant and sometimes lethal to noncombatants. But it will not be the only aspect of that war.
No military is going to forsake kinetic strikes for overt cyber strikes in the foreseeable future. Even assuming the effectiveness of a successful cyber strike, the reliability usually isn’t there. And if something is worth an overt strike without a reliable offensive cyber capability, then it’s worth a kinetic strike. Since there is no reason to believe that cyber can be anything but a complement to kinetic anytime soon, the idea of cyberdeterrence is meaningless without the more traditional forms of deterrence.
It’s worth noting that of the three scenarios mentioned in the Wired blurb, two are about the US interfering in a conflict between other states (India v. Pakistan and Russia v. Georgia) and one is about setting up honeypots for terrorists à la Dark Market. Nowhere does it mention an instance where the US is really a combatant. There’s a good reason for this: the US can deter other actors precisely because of its unparalleled strength. If the US launches an overt cyber strike, you can bet that it will be prepared to precipitate kinetic consequences and to get into a “real” fight.
Would we really attack India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear C2 in order to keep them from using nukes on each other? Not likely. It would be hard if not impossible to do effectively, might backfire in any number of ways, and the threat of US interference certainly wouldn’t deter them any more than nuclear war would.
Would we really deploy a “cyberdeterrent squad to disrupt the Russian military’s communication networks” over Georgia? Not likely. Georgia isn’t worth an essentially strategic strike against Russia in any event, especially if we couldn’t commit to a larger conflict that might emerge.
The “kinder, gentler deterrence” Arquilla talks about is little more than a proverbial shot over the bow. And it only works because of our real guns.